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Abstract 
 
Recent litigation by the California Attorney General has sparked 
renewed interest in the role of environmental justice under federal and state 
project environmental review laws.  Some say that inserting environmental 
justice into environmental review marks a “radical expansion” of the role of 
social justice in environmental review.  Environmental justice is now a well-
established federal legal doctrine addressing communities disproportion-
ately exposed to environmental hazards as a result of their social or 
economic demographics.  The doctrine is supported by President Clinton’s 
executive order, along with agency guidelines and regulations under the 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), which govern federal project 
environmental review.  Using the environmental justice doctrine as a tool 
during project environmental review assures careful analysis of local or 
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and for many years directed its Environmental Law and Justice Clinic.  He 
received his BA from Stanford University, his JD from Boalt Hall, UC Berkeley 
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regional impacts on communities burdened by adverse social and economic 
conditions.  Federal civil rights laws also support the doctrine, 
notwithstanding recent U.S. Supreme Court civil rights decisions restricting 
access to justice and consideration of race in employment testing.  
California has followed the federal lead and has been a leading state in 
adopting environmental justice statutes and policies. Thus, it is no surprise 
that the Attorney General of California has sought to employ environmental 
justice during the environmental review process.   
California’s civil rights laws are stronger than federal civil rights 
protections, and the state has endorsed environmental justice, both 
generally and specifically, in its global warming regulatory regime.  These 
legal requirements support incorporating environmental justice when 
applying the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), which is largely 
modeled on NEPA.  Environmental justice assures that the physical impacts 
are properly understood in the socioeconomic context, and that cumulative 
impacts, possible mitigation, and alternatives are properly assessed.  Recent 
California case law questioning CEQA’s application to projects situated near 
hazards does not impact the fundamental role of environmental justice in 
environmental review.  The Attorney General is properly concerned with 
projects that add to the burdens of vulnerable low-income communities or 
communities of color. 
I. Introduction 
The California Attorney General’s recent litigation involving 
transportation planning and air pollutants (including global warming 
emissions) affecting minority communities has sparked renewed interest in 
the relationship between environmental review laws and the doctrine of 
environmental justice.  Environmental justice addresses disproportionate 
environmental impacts on communities of color, low-income communities, 
and other demographics that have historically faced discrimination.  
California Attorney General Kamala D. Harris has actually intervened in two 
cases challenging projects or programs for their failure to analyze 
disproportionate impacts on minority communities.1  Some say the Attorney 
General’s actions mark a “radical expansion” of the role of social justice in 
environmental review.2 
 
1. CEQA Litigation and Settlements, STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, http://oag.ca.gov/environment/ceqa/ 
litigation-settlements (last visited June 8, 2012). 
2. See Peter Hsiao, David Gold, Miles Imwalle & Jennifer Jeffers, 
Environmental Justice as Environmental Impact: The Intersection of Environmental 
Justice, Climate Change, and the California Environmental Quality Act, BlOOMBERG 
BNA WORLD CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT, March 12, 2012, at 2. 
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This article contends that the environmental justice doctrine does not 
merely belong in project environmental review; rather it is essential to ensure 
that environmental review fully captures the disproportionate effects of 
environmental impacts on communities of color and low-income 
communities.  The Attorney General’s interest in environmental justice is a 
return to well-founded principles of federal environmental analysis and civil 
rights protection.  As California is one of the state leaders in the adoption of 
environmental justice policies, the Attorney General’s actions provide an 
opportunity to evaluate the current vibrancy of legal environmental justice 
doctrines in connection with project environmental review.   
Federal law supports environmental justice analysis in the review of 
projects seeking approval under the National Environmental Policy Act 
(“NEPA”).  The California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) also provides 
ample authority for the use of environmental justice doctrines during 
environmental review.  Environmental justice groups have often cited 
environmental justice concerns in regulatory proceedings involving the 
review of projects on both the federal and state level.3   
To be sure, there are federal and state court decisions, as well as 
applicable regulations, that eschew social factors in certain circumstances 
during environmental review.  A line of California cases also seems to 
question whether existing environmental hazards are even relevant to 
projects that bring people into those conditions.  And it is true that the 
current United States Supreme Court majority seems more hostile than ever 
toward attempts to address racial discrimination through the law.  This 
article suggests, however, that none of these cases should be construed to 
mean that environmental justice is inappropriately brought into project 
environmental review. 
  This article asserts that government agencies, community activists, 
and others who are concerned with social justice should not hesitate to 
assert that environmental review laws must address environmental justice.  
 
3. E.g., In re: Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. & Shell Offshore, Inc., 2010 EPA 
App. LEXIS 49 at *111 (EAB 2010); Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 6 
E.A.DD. 66 (1995); In re: Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, 6 E.A.D. 253 
(EAB 1995).  The author for many years directed the Environmental Law and 
Justice Clinic at Golden Gate University School of Law where Title VI and, 
more broadly, environmental justice issues were frequently asserted.  See 
Alan Ramo, Hunters Point: Energy Development Meets Environmental Justice, 5 
ENVT’L L. NEWS 28 (Spring 1996) available at http://digitalcommons.law.ggu. 
edu/pubs/128/ (discussing the California Energy Commission’s first 
evidentiary hearings on environmental justice); Clifford Rechtschaffen,  
Fighting Back Against a Power Plant: Some Lessons From the Legal and Organizing 
Efforts of the Bayview-Hunters Point Community, 14 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVT’L L. & 
POL’Y 537 (Winter 2008). 
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Section II analyzes the roots of the federal environmental justice doctrine 
and its current requirements in light of recent federal civil rights cases.  
Section III discusses California’s environmental justice requirements.  
Section IV applies these California environmental justice requirements 
specifically to CEQA.  Section V then reviews the California Attorney 
General’s litigation based upon these legal principles.  Section VI concludes 
that a proper understanding of environmental justice should be a key part of 
project environmental review. 
II. Federal Environmental Justice Requirements 
A. The Roots of the Federal Environmental Justice Doctrine 
The doctrine of environmental justice originated in 1981 from a protest 
led by civil rights activist Reverend Benjamin Chavis against the siting of a 
polychlorinated biphenyl (“PCB”) hazardous waste site in a community of 
color in North Carolina, during which Chavis first coined the term 
“environmental racism.”4  The protest spurred the Washington DC 
Congressional delegate, Walter Fauntroy, to ask the United States General 
Accounting Office to examine toxic waste sites located in the Southeast 
United States.5  This resulted in a report that showed that the sites were 
disproportionately located near poor African-American communities.6  
Finally, in 1992, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“U.S. 
EPA”) investigated and affirmed in its “Reducing Risk in All Communities” 
report that the siting of waste sites was indeed related to race.7  Other 
landmark studies reinforced the finding that race was an important 
demographic predictor of exposure to hazardous sites, not merely a random 
phenomenon, and that race was a more important factor than income.8  With 
 
4. Dollie Burwell & Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Comes Full Circle:  
Warren County Before and After, 1 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 9, 24 (2007). 
5. Id. at 26. 
6. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-83-168, SITING of 
HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND 
ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES, (U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1983); see Burwell & Cole, supra note 4, at 36-38. 
7. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA 230-R-92-008, 
REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES (1992). 
8. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC 
WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE 
SITES (1987).  The study, using data on location of hazardous waste sites and 
demographic data based upon zip codes, found that the percentage of 
minority residents in communities containing these waste sites was twice as 
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the aid of experts such as Robert Bullard,9 an activist movement asserting 
the right of low income communities and communities of color to be free of 
disproportionate risks from environmental hazards began to grow.10  
 That same year, Congressman John Lewis and then Senator Al Gore 
introduced the Environmental Justice Act of 1992, the first legislative 
attempt to codify the demands of the movement.11  The proposed law 
required identification of “environmental high impact areas” (counties with 
the most toxic hot spots) with a moratorium on additional siting of toxic 
facilities until the areas were deemed to have met certain health standards.  
In 1994, President Clinton issued an executive order and a presidential 
memorandum that established environmental justice as a doctrine binding 
federal agencies in their administration of federal laws.12   
Implementing agencies began to issue various policy documents 
explaining how they would apply the law.  The Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) issued its own guidelines on how to integrate environmental 
 
great as the percentage of minority residents in zip codes without such 
facilities (24% versus 12%), and that the proportion of racial minorities in 
communities containing two facilities or major landfills was three times 
greater (38%).  See Lena Williams, Race Bias Found in Location of Toxic Dumps, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1987, at A20; Bunay Bryant & Paul Mohai, Environmental 
Racism: Reviewing the Evidence, RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE 163, 164, 169 (Bunay Bryant & Paul Mohai 
eds., 1992); BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN ET AL., TOXIC WASTES AND RACE REVISITED: AN 
UPDATE OF THE 1987 REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC 
CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 13-18 (1994). 
For more recent data, see ROBERT D. BULLARD, PAUL MOHAI, ROBIN SAHA & 
BEVERLY WRIGHT, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE AT TWENTY: WHY RACE STILL MATTERS 
AFTER ALL OF THESE YEARS, 1978-2007 (2007); MANUEL PASTOR, JR., RACHEL 
MORELLO-FROSCH, AND JAMES SADD, STILL TOXIC AFTER ALL THESE YEARS: AIR 
QUALITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA (2007). 
9. See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice: A New Framework for Action, 
ENVTL. L. NEWS, Spring 1996, at 16. 
10. An excellent history of the Environmental Justice movement is 
provided in LUKE W. COLE, SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP:  
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT, 
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS (2000).  
11. H.R. 5326, 102d Cong. (2d Sess. 1992); S. 2806, 102d Cong. (2d 
Sess. 1992); see Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting: 
Risk-Based Representation and Equitable Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 353 
(1995). 
12. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994); 
Memorandum on Environmental Justice, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC 279 (Feb. 11, 
1994). 
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justice into NEPA.13  The EPA also provided a definition of environmental 
justice for regulatory purposes, which focused on the concept of “fair 
treatment”: 
 
Environmental Justice is the fair treatment and meaningful 
involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national 
origin, or income with respect to the development, 
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, 
regulations, and policies . . . . Fair treatment means that no 
group of people should bear a disproportionate share of the 
negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, 
governmental and commercial operations or policies[.]  
Meaningful involvement means that: (1) people have an 
opportunity to participate in decisions about activities that may 
affect their environment and/or health; (2) the public’s 
contribution can influence the regulatory agency’s decision; (3) 
their concerns will be considered in the decision making process; 
and (4) the decision makers seek out and facilitate the 
involvement of those potentially affected[.]14 
 
President Clinton’s Cover Memorandum for Executive Order 12898 
made clear that Title VI of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 and NEPA 
would be integral to the discussion of environmental injustice: 
 
In accordance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, each 
Federal agency shall ensure that all programs or activities 
receiving Federal financial assistance that affect human health or 
the environment do not directly, or through contractual or other 
arrangements, use criteria, methods, or practices that 
discriminate on the basis of race, color, or national origin.15 
 
Executive Order 12898 required agencies to incorporate environmental 
justice analysis into NEPA’s existing requirements – requirements such as 
environmental assessments, environmental impact statements, and records 
of decision.16 
 
13. U.S. EPA, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
CONCERNS IN EPA’S NEPA COMPLIANCE ANALYSES (1998). 
14. U.S. EPA, Environmental Justice: Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/ 
environmentaljustice/basics/index.html  (last visited June 8, 2012). 
15. See Memorandum on Environmental Justice, supra note 12. 
16. Id. 
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  Title VI prohibits state agencies receiving federal financial assistance 
from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin.17  
Consequently, government agencies, including the EPA, developed 
regulations prohibiting discrimination, for example, in the siting of projects 
and the use of any criteria or methods in administering its program which 
“have the effect” of subjecting individuals to discrimination on the grounds 
of race, color, national origin, or sex.18  This is the so-called disparate 
impacts test.19 
These regulations are normally interpreted to prohibit disparate 
impact unless a funding recipient can show a legitimate governmental 
purpose for the disparate impact and the complainant is unable to show a 
less discriminatory alternative for achieving that legitimate purpose.20  Title 
VI provides that federal agencies must adopt regulatory procedures to allow 
for private administrative complaints21 alleging violations of these 
regulations against federal funding recipients to be adjudged by the federal 
agencies, with the ultimate remedy being a loss of federal funding.22   
Federal authority to address civil rights and environmental justice 
derives from Congress’s authority to ban unconstitutional discrimination.  
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution specifically 
prohibits states from denying “to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”23  Further, the Constitution provides explicit 
authority for Congress “to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions 
of [the Amendment].”24  Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress 
broad powers of enforcement.25  These powers include “the authority both to 
remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed [by the Fourteenth 
 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012). 
18. E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b)-(c) (2012). 
19. Id. 
20. Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 
F.2d 1403, 14 (11th Cir. 1985)  
21. For an example of a recent Title VI administrative complaint, see 
Alan Ramo, New Civil Rights Complaint Attacks California’s Greenhouse Gas Cap & 
Trade Program as Racially Discriminatory, (June 12, 2012), http://ggucuel.org/new-
civil-rights-complaint-attacks-california%E2%80%99s-greenhouse-gas-cap-
trade-program-as-racially-discriminatory/6-8-12-cse-v-carb-title-vi-
complaint-3. 
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2012).  
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
25. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732 (1982).  
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Amendment] by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, 
including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text.”26 
The exercise of presidential leadership and the new doctrine of 
environmental justice led federal agencies to begin thinking about how to 
incorporate environmental justice into environmental review.  The Council 
on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) and, ultimately, the EPA were the key 
players in developing these policies because of their principal oversight role 
in implementing NEPA. 
B. Federal Environmental Justice Law and NEPA 
Many federal environmental justice battles arise out of regulatory 
proceedings for permits or the preparation of environmental impact 
statements and reports.27  CEQ is charged with developing regulations to 
control how federal agencies implement NEPA.28  In 1997, CEQ published 
new guidance for how federal agencies should address environmental 
justice.29  This guidance became the model for federal agencies to use in 
addressing environmental justice.30  
The EPA has broad authority to comment on any agency’s 
environmental review documents.31  It followed CEQ with its own guidelines 
on environmental justice in which it presented a number of examples of how 
environmental justice may be brought into the project environmental review 
process.32  The guidelines recognize that, due to unique cultural or 
 
26. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518 (2004) (citing Kimel v. Florida 
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000)). 
27. See In re: Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment 
Center), 47 N.R.C. 77 (1998). 
28. Exec. Order No. 11,514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (Mar. 5, 1970).  
29. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, GUIDANCE UNDER THE NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT  (Dec. 10, 1997). 
30. E.g., U.S. N.R.C., ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW GUIDANCE FOR LICENSING 
ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH NMSS PROGRAMS  (Aug. 22, 2003) & U.S. NRC, 
PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE FOR PREPARING ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS AND 
CONSIDERING ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES  (May 24, 2004), discussed in U.S. NRC, 
POLICY STATEMENT ON THE TREATMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MATTERS IN 
NRC REGULATORY AND LICENSING ACTIONS, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,040, 52,041 (Aug. 24, 
2004). 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2012). 
32. See U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF FEDERAL ACTIVITIES, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR 
INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS IN EPA’S NEPA COMPLIANCE 
ANALYSES (Apr. 1998). 
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socioeconomic challenges facing minority or low-income communities, 
some cumulative impacts or resource utilization may not be apparent during 
a typical scoping or screening of a project.  As the EPA guidance states: 
 
This includes subsistence living situations (e.g., subsistence 
fishing, hunting, gathering, farming), diet, and other differential 
patterns of consumption of natural resources.  If a community is 
reliant on consumption of natural resources, such as subsistence 
fishing, an additional exposure pathway may be associated with 
the community that is not relevant to the population at large.  
Similarly, dietary practices within a community or ethnic group, 
such as a diet low in certain vitamins and minerals, may increase 
risk factors for that group.33 
 
Due to historical zoning practices and an imbalance of power resulting 
from poverty and racism, minority and low-income communities may face 
multiple exposures to toxic hazards with few resources to mitigate these 
exposures.  The guidance recognizes the importance of these factors when 
addressing cumulative impacts: 
 
This includes such issues as whether affordable or free quality 
health care is available and, whether any cultural barriers exist to 
seeking health care.  Many low-income and/or minority 
communities lack adequate levels and quality of health care, 
often due to lack of resources or lack of access to health care 
facilities . . . . 
 
Other indirect effects which a low-income or minority population, 
due to economic disadvantage, may not be able to avoid, that 
will have a synergistic effect with other risk factors (e.g., vehicle 
pollution, lead-based paint poisoning, existence of abandoned 
toxic sites, dilapidated housing stock).34 
 
Thus, the guidance calls for demographic analysis at the beginning of 
project review.  If vulnerable subpopulations will be exposed, “this should 
trigger both an enhanced outreach effort to assure that low-income and 
minority populations are engaged in public participation and analysis 
designed to identify and assess the impacts.  Also, a positive response to 
this question should increase the team’s sensitivity to the potential for 
cumulative impacts.”35 
 
33. Id. at Section 2.3, Exhibit 3. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at Section 3.2.1. 
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In theory, this approach is merely assuring a more thorough 
environmental analysis.  The guidance seems to denote, however, that 
typical everyday analysis might overlook many of these factors.  Thus, 
demographic analysis is necessary to ensure that a more proper effort with 
an appropriate level of sensitivity is conducted in order to root out what 
should be determined, under conventional environmental review analysis, to 
be significant impacts.  The guidance states that their intent is to “heighten 
awareness of EPA staff in addressing environmental justice issues within 
NEPA analyses and considering the full potential for disproportionately high 
and adverse human health or environmental effects on minority populations 
and low-income populations. . . .”36 
The EPA has yet to finalize the specifics of what a demographic 
analysis entails.  Its draft guidance, explaining how states should conduct a 
demographic analysis, remains no more than a draft more than twelve years 
after work on it began.  But the basics are clear in that states must: 
(1) Identify the potentially impacted populations and determine their 
race, ethnicity, and/or nationality; 
(2) Compare the impacts on that population to other populations that 
might have been affected by an alternative to the project;  
(3) Examine other sources of impacts to determine if there are 
additive, cumulative or synergistic impacts as a result of other projects and 
their social and economic settings; 
(4) Determine whether alone, or together with other impacts, the 
project is having significantly adverse impacts on the subpopulation and 
whether there are reasonable, less discriminatory, alternatives or potential 
means of mitigation.37   
Considering environmental justice during the environmental review 
process enhances discussion over what defines a “significant impact,” as 
well as the range of alternatives and mitigation methods.  “Significance” is a 
key factor in any environmental review.  If an impact is significant and is not 
mitigated, a full-blown Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) is required.  
Federal regulations call the alternatives analysis in an EIS the heart of 
environmental review.38  In other words, failure to identify a significant 
impact that could have been identified through proper environmental 
justice analysis would be a violation of NEPA and a potential civil rights 
violation, as would the failure to consider a mitigation of that impact or an 
 
36. Id. at Section 1.0. 
37. See DRAFT TITLE VI GUIDANCE FOR EPA ASSISTANCE RECIPIENTS 
ADMINISTERING ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITTING PROGRAMS (DRAFT RECIPIENT 
GUIDANCE) AND DRAFT REVISED GUIDANCE FOR INVESTIGATING TITLE VI 
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS (DRAFT REVISED INVESTIGATION 
GUIDANCE), 65 Fed. Reg. 39,650 (June 27, 2000).  
38. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14  (2012). 
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alternative that would avoid that impact.  Thus, the EPA Guidance calls for 
more focused analyses when there are environmental justice concerns: 
 
Environmental justice concerns may lead to more focused 
analyses, identifying significant effects that may otherwise have 
been diluted by examination of a larger population or area.  
Environmental justice concerns should always trigger the serious 
evaluation of alternatives as well as mitigation options.39 
 
“Significance” is a vague term that depends upon the impact’s context 
and intensity under federal law.  “Context . . . means that the significance of 
an action must be analyzed in several contexts such as society as a whole 
(human, national), the affected region, the affected interest, and the 
locality.”40  CEQ explains:  
 
Agency consideration of impacts on low-income populations, 
minority populations, or Indian tribes may lead to the 
identification of disproportionately high and adverse human 
health or environmental effects that are significant and that 
otherwise would be overlooked.41 
 
Federal law requires that the alternatives analysis in an EIS should 
provide a reasonable range of choices to address potential impacts and 
achieve the project’s purposes.42  If the project raises environmental justice 
concerns, the Guidance makes clear that in order to be considered 
reasonable, a range of alternatives “should be drawn so as to allow an 
assessment of the disproportionate nature of the effects, as well as the 
magnitude of the effects, on the communities of concern.”43   
Mitigation is the final essential element of a federal environmental 
review analysis.  It, too, must reflect environmental justice concerns: “In 
addition, for each alternative that may result in potential environmental 
justice concerns, mitigation measures aimed specifically at those impacts 
should be identified and analyzed.”44  
None of these requirements change NEPA’s fundamental proscription 
on considering stand-alone economic or social impacts to be a basis for a 
 
39. U.S. EPA, supra note 32, at Section 1.2. 
40. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(a) (2012). 
41. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 29, at 10. 
42. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (2012). 
43. U.S. EPA, supra note 32, at 3.2.5. 
44. Id.  
West  Northwest, Vol. 19, No. 1, Winter 2013 
 
52 
 
significant impact finding that requires further environmental analysis.45  The 
Supreme Court settled that question years ago.46  However, where those 
economic or social impacts are interrelated, they must be examined: 
 
When an environmental impact statement is prepared and 
economic or social and natural or physical environmental effects 
are interrelated, then the environmental impact statement will 
discuss all of these effects on the human environment.47 
C. Recent Federal Civil Rights Cases and Title VI’s Viability 
While the above-described civil rights and environmental justice 
policies remain in place, recent decisions addressing Title VI, coming 
primarily out of the United States Supreme Court, must give one pause 
about the full force and effect of Title VI as a tool for environmental justice.  
However, none of these cases should affect the basic underlying doctrine of 
environmental justice and its use during environmental review.  
 The Supreme Court has significantly narrowed an individuals’ ability 
to protect their civil rights.  Specifically, in Alexander v. Sandoval48 the Court 
rejected the right of individuals to enforce Title VI’s administrative 
regulations in court, instead requiring individuals to address all complaints 
alleging disparate impacts directly to the agencies themselves under the 
statute’s provisions for administrative complaint procedures, pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (§ 602).  The Court also clarified that 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, the 
part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that bans discrimination by funding 
recipients, only bans intentional discrimination as it reaches no further than 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause or the Fifth 
Amendment’s due process clause. 49  On that basis, while according to 
 
45. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14  (2012) (“This means that economic or social 
effects are not intended by themselves to require preparation of an 
environmental impact statement.”). 
46. Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 
778 (1983) (“If a harm does not have a sufficiently close connection to the 
physical environment, NEPA does not apply.”).  In an unpublished opinion, 
the Fourth Circuit refused to set aside a decision to not require an EIS 
merely upon a failure to consider disparate economic and social impacts “by 
themselves”, after the Court found there was no Title VI violation.  Goshen 
Rd. Envtl. Action Team v. United States Dep’t of Agric., U.S. App. LEXIS 6135 
(4th cir. 1999).  
47. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1978); see Tongass Conservation Soc. v. Cheney, 
924 F.2d 1137, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
48. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).   
49. Id. at 280-281. 
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agency regulations individuals can still file administrative complaints to 
agencies based upon a showing of disparate impact, they can only enforce 
the statutory ban on discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d in court if they 
can show intentional discrimination.50   
Other courts have further constrained any attempt to bootstrap 
administrative regulation enforcement in court through other civil rights 
laws such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.51  Plaintiffs have thus found it difficult to 
enforce Title VI in environmental justice cases.52 
Sandoval did not prohibit agencies from enforcing their disparate 
impact regulations themselves.  Currently, the Supreme Court has 
“assumed” that administrative complaints alleging merely disparate impact 
are permissible under 40 U.S.C. § 2000d-1, pursuant to agency regulations.53  
Nor is there anything else in the decision that practically undermines the 
relationship between social and economic factors and physical impacts that 
would constrain a NEPA review. 
In 2009, in Ricci v. Destefano54 in 2009, the Court raised the specter that it 
would outright prohibit the use of explicit racial factors.  There, the City of 
New Haven used a test to promote firefighters that disparately impacted 
African Americans’ results.55  The City, faced with threats from Whites and 
Hispanics who were promoted, and from African Americans who were not, 
decided to throw out the test. 56  As expected, because of this decision, 
White and Hispanic firefighters sued.57  The Supreme Court found that the 
City’s action, based upon the disparate impact alone, constituted 
impermissible adverse disparate treatment towards Whites and Hispanics 
on the basis of race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.58 
As Title VII is often seen as a model for Title VI’s implementation,59 for 
purposes of analyzing the role of environmental justice in environmental 
review it is important to clarify what the Ricci Court did and what it did not 
do.  It did not prohibit the consideration of race when addressing disparate 
 
50. Id.  
51. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 
771 (2001). 
52. Id. 
53. Alexander v. Sandoval, supra note 48, at 281-282 (2001). 
54. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
55. Id. at 579. 
56. Id. at 557. 
57. Id.  
58. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000(e) et seq. (Title VII prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). 
59. Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 
F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985).  
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impact, nor did it declare unconstitutional a disparate impact test under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause.  Rather, the Court issued 
a statutory interpretation of Title VII that explains how the disparate impact 
test would work under these circumstances.  A showing of disparate impact 
is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, unless 
rebutted by a business necessity and with no showing by a plaintiff of a less 
discriminatory alternative: 
 
Under the disparate-impact statute, a plaintiff establishes a 
prima facie violation by showing that an employer uses a 
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.  42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).  An employer may defend against 
liability by demonstrating that the practice is job related for the 
position in question and consistent with business necessity. 
Even if the employer meets that burden, however, a plaintiff may 
still succeed by showing that the employer refuses to adopt an 
available alternative employment practice that has less disparate 
impact and serves the employer’s legitimate needs.  42 U.S.C.S. 
§§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C).60  
 
This is the same test that was always thought to apply to Title VI 
disparate impact claims.61  In this case, the Court simply made clear that the 
motivation to avoid liability under this provision is not sufficient, as a 
matter of law, to justify an action based upon race unless the City fails the 
entire disparate impact test: 
 
Whatever the City’s ultimate aim—however well intentioned or 
benevolent it might have seemed—the City made its 
employment decision because of race.  The City rejected the test 
results solely because the higher scoring candidates were white. 
The question is not whether that conduct was discriminatory but 
whether the City had a lawful justification for its race-based 
action.62  
 
The City did not fail due to its consideration of race, but, rather, its 
failure to develop a “strong-basis-in-evidence” showing that racial 
disparities were not related to a legitimate governmental function or that 
there was a less discriminatory alternative: 
 
60. Ricci v. Destefano, supra note 54, at 578. 
61. Bradford C. Mank, Proving an Environmental Justice Case:  Determining 
An Appropriate Comparison Population, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 365, 388 (2001). 
62. Ricci v. Destefano, supra note 54, at 579-80.  
 West  Northwest, Vol. 19, No. 1, Winter 2013 
 
55 
 
Congress has imposed liability on employers for unintentional 
discrimination in order to rid the workplace of “practices that are 
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.” Griggs, supra, at 431, 
91 S. Ct. 849, 28 L. Ed. 2d 158.  But it has also prohibited 
employers from taking adverse employment actions “because of” 
race. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Applying the strong-basis-in-evidence 
standard to Title VII gives effect to both the disparate-treatment 
and disparate-impact provisions, allowing violations of one in 
the name of compliance with the other only in certain, narrow 
circumstances.  The standard leaves ample room for employers’ 
voluntary compliance efforts, which are essential to the statutory 
scheme and to Congress’s efforts to eradicate workplace 
discrimination.  See Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 515, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 92 
L. Ed. 2d 405.  And the standard appropriately constrains 
employers’ discretion in making race-based decisions: It limits 
that discretion to cases in which there is a strong basis in 
evidence of disparate-impact liability, but it is not so restrictive 
that it allows employers to act only when there is a provable, 
actual violation.63  
  
Thus, federal law, through Title VI, survives these decisions and 
remains an important tool for environmental justice.  Race or other 
demographic considerations may be considered if necessary to carry out the 
legitimate governmental purpose to avoid significant adverse environmental 
impacts to vulnerable populations.  Further, if those impacts are identified, 
and not justified by a separate legitimate governmental purpose where there 
are no less discriminatory alternatives, then these impacts must be 
addressed or the action causing those impacts prohibited.  Title VI, in 
concert with environmental review under NEPA, should allow environmental 
justice to be addressed with its focus on adverse physical impacts, 
alternatives analysis, and mitigation.   
There is reason for concern about the direction that the United States 
Supreme Court is taking.  Justice Scalia, one vote in the majority, warned: 
I join the Court’s opinion in full, but write separately to observe that 
its resolution of this dispute merely postpones the evil day on which the 
Court will have to confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the 
disparate-impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection?”64 
Yet until that day comes, federal law continues to support the use of 
racial and other demographic considerations to ensure environmental 
 
63. Id. at 583. 
64. Id. at 594. 
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justice during environmental review.  The analysis just has to be thorough 
and properly done. 
Thus, under NEPA, environmental justice affects every stage of 
environmental review, from initial screening to the decision to require a full 
EIS, and the actual contents of that EIS.  Environmental justice, as the 
interlinking of social and economic justice with physical environmental 
impacts, is not merely an artificial grafting of social justice onto federal 
environmental review policies.  It is an essential tool for ensuring thorough 
environmental review under challenging social circumstances consistent 
with civil rights protections.  CEQA, said by many state courts to be 
modeled after NEPA, essentially requires the same analysis, as discussed 
below.   
III. California Environmental Justice Requirements 
California is a leading state in adopting the doctrine of environmental 
justice.  The California legislature explicitly adopted an environmental 
justice statute that requires the California Environmental Protection Agency  
(“Cal/EPA”) to “[c]onduct its programs, policies, and activities that 
substantially affect human health or the environment in a manner that 
ensures the fair treatment of people of all races, cultures, and income levels, 
including minority populations and low-income populations of the state.”65  
This definition of environmental justice is very similar to the federal EPA’s 
definition.66  Further, the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research is 
required to coordinate and consult with all of the state agencies’ 
environmental justice programs.67  Following the lines of Clinton’s Executive 
Order, the legislation calls upon the agencies overseen by Cal/EPA to 
include strategies to address environmental justice in their missions and 
action plans.68   
Further, California has created its own state equivalent of Title VI, and 
then made it even broader while avoiding the pitfalls of Sandoval.  California 
outlaws discrimination based upon race, national origin, ethnic group 
identification, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, color, genetic 
information, and disability by the state or its agencies or any program 
 
65. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 71110(a) (Deering 2012). 
66. See U.S. EPA, Environmental Justice, http://www.epa.gov/environmen 
taljustice/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2012) (“Environmental Justice is the fair 
treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, 
color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, 
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and 
policies.”). 
67. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65040.12 (Deering 2012).  
68. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 71111 et seq. (Deering 2012). 
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funded by the state.69  Administrative remedies do not preclude a private 
right of action to enforce the statute, or the regulations implementing the 
statute, and California law allows actions seeking equitable relief.70  The 
regulations implementing the statute explicitly endorse the disparate 
impact test prohibiting “. . .criteria or method of administration that (1) have 
the purpose or effect of subjecting a person to discrimination . . . .”71  There 
is an explicit prohibition on discriminatory sitings that “have the purpose or 
effect of . . . subjecting them to discrimination . . . .”72   
The impact of environmental justice has affected numerous other 
policies, particularly those involving air pollution and, more recently, 
climate change.  A key environmental justice issue has been the problem of 
toxic hot spots, that is, regions of exposure to multiple sources of toxic 
chemicals primarily (although not exclusively) in urban core areas.73  In 
response to demands from environmental organizations,74 the California 
Legislature adopted the Air Toxics “Hot Spots” Information and Assessment 
Act.75  The Legislature specifically commented on the problem of multiple 
facilities, located close together, releasing toxic airborne chemicals: 
 
These releases may create localized concentrations or air toxics 
“hot spots” where emissions from specific sources may expose 
individuals and population groups to elevated risks of adverse 
health effects, including, but not limited to, cancer and 
contribute to the cumulative health risks of emissions from other 
 
69. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135 (Deering 2012). 
70. Id. at § 11139 (Deering 2012); see Comm. Concerning Cmty. 
Improvement v. City of Modesto, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31022 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 
30, 2004). 
71. 22 C.C.R. § 98101(i) (2012). 
72. Id. at § 98101(j)(1) (2012). 
73. Helen H. Kang, Pursuing Environmental Justice: Obstacles and 
Opportunities - Lessons from the Field, 31 Wash. U. J.L. & POL’Y 121, 123-125 
(2009); Emily L. Dawson, Lessons Learned from Flint, Michigan: Managing Multiple 
Source Pollution in Urban Communities, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
367, 395-397 (Winter 2001); Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice 
Implications of Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 118-120 
(1996). 
74. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44301(a) (Deering 2012).  In § 
44301(a), the Legislature specifically declared it was responding to “recent 
publicity surrounding planned and unplanned releases of toxic chemicals 
into the atmosphere”, noting “the public has become increasingly concerned 
about toxics in the air.”  
75. Id. at § 44301 et seq. (Deering 2012). 
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sources in the area.  In some cases where large populations may 
not be significantly affected by adverse health risks, individuals 
may be exposed to significant risks.76 
 
The statute requires local air districts to keep toxics emissions 
inventories of sources of toxic air pollutants.77  On the basis of the 
inventories, the local districts are required to focus upon the most severe 
facilities, complete a risk assessment, and, if the risks are deemed too great, 
acquire plans for reducing the risks to acceptable levels.78 
The Legislature explicitly revisited environmental justice when 
developing the landmark California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, 
known as AB 32.79  The Act set forth the ambitious goal of reducing 
California’s greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.80  The 
Legislature gave its California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) the flexibility to 
design a plan using “direct emission reduction measures, alternative 
compliance mechanisms, market-based compliance mechanisms, and 
potential monetary and nonmonetary incentives for sources and categories 
of sources . . . .”81 
The potential (and now actual) use of market mechanisms causes real 
concern among environmental justice advocates.  They have raised many 
questions, such as:  
(1) Would market mechanisms concentrate emissions in urban 
neighborhoods causing hot spots?82   
(2) Would minority communities share in the benefits of any program 
that auctions allowances in a trading program or would they share in the 
same reduction of co-pollutants as other communities if trading were 
allowed?83  After all, the state’s civil rights act speaks not only of 
 
76. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44301(d) (Deering 2012). 
77. Id. at § 44340 et seq. (Deering 2012). 
78. Id. at §§ 44360 et seq., 44390 et seq. (Deering 2012). 
79. Id. at § 38500 et seq. (Deering 2012). 
80. Id. at §§ 38550, 38561 (Deering 2012). 
81. Id. at § 38561(b) (Deering 2012). 
82. See Richard Toshiyuki Drury, et. al., Pollution Trading and 
Environmental Injustice:  Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 231 (Spring 1999); Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, the Clean 
Air Act, and Industrial Pollution, 30 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 51, at n. 188 (2012). 
83. See Luthien Niland, Cal. Cap-And-Trade Auction Money: Where Should It 
Go?, CENTER ON URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Feb. 15, 2012), available at 
http://ggucuel.org/cal-cap-and-trade-auction-money-where-should-it-go. 
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“discrimination” but also of the denial of the “benefits” of a state program on 
the basis of race.84 
The California Legislature acknowledged these concerns and 
reaffirmed environmental justice as an important doctrine in California 
environmental law.  The Legislature required that CARB, when adopting 
regulations setting any emission limits and reduction measures, “[e]nsure 
that activities undertaken to comply with the regulations do not 
disproportionately impact low-income communities.”85  It further recognized 
the concern over toxic hot spots and required that the regulations “[e]nsure 
that activities undertaken pursuant to the regulations complement, and do 
not interfere with, efforts to achieve and maintain federal and state ambient 
air quality standards and to reduce toxic air contaminant emissions.”86 
The Legislature similarly incorporated civil rights doctrines, requiring 
that disadvantaged communities not be excluded from the benefits of state 
programs: 
 
The state board shall ensure that the greenhouse gas emission 
reduction rules, regulations, programs, mechanisms, and 
incentives under its jurisdiction, where applicable and to the 
extent feasible, direct public and private investment toward the 
most disadvantaged communities in California and provide an 
opportunity for small businesses, schools, affordable housing 
associations, and other community institutions to participate in 
and benefit from statewide efforts to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.87 
 
The Legislature understood the environmental justice concerns about 
market mechanisms and, initially, there was open conflict over the use of 
trading between the Governor and the Legislature.88  While it provided the 
Governor with the option of utilizing market mechanisms, the Legislature, in 
the very same provision, affirmed environmental justice principles: 
 
84. CAL GOV’T CODE § 11135 (2012) (“No person . . . shall, on the basis of 
race . . . be unlawfully denied full and equal access to the benefits of . . . any 
program . . . .”). 
85. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b)(2) (Deering 2012). 
86. Id. at § 38562(b)(4) (Deering 2012). 
87. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38565 (Deering 2012). 
88. Mark Martin, Governor, Lawmakers Differ on Greenhouse Gas Measure; 
Conflict Over How Industry Should Reduce Emissions, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 
Aug. 24, 2006, at A16. 
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(a) The state board may include in the regulations adopted pursuant to 
Section 38562 the use of market-based compliance mechanisms to comply 
with the regulations. 
(b) Prior to the inclusion of any market-based compliance mechanism 
in the regulations, to the extent feasible and in furtherance of achieving the 
statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit, the state board shall do all of the 
following: 
(1) Consider the potential for direct, indirect, and cumulative emission 
impacts from these mechanisms, including localized impacts in 
communities that are already adversely impacted by air pollution. 
(2) Design any market-based compliance mechanism to prevent any 
increase in the emissions of toxic air contaminants or criteria air 
pollutants.89 
Recently, a California Court of Appeal implicitly affirmed the 
importance of environmental justice analysis in the application of the state’s 
global warming laws.  In rejecting a challenge by an environmental justice 
organization to a plan for implementing the laws, the court stated, “public 
health and environmental justice were factors considered in connection with 
each of the 11 measures analyzed for the agriculture sector.”90  Further, CARB 
conducted a case study in the largely Hispanic Wilmington area of Los 
Angeles to evaluate the potential environmental justice impacts of its 
greenhouse gas reduction program: 
 
Indeed, another of [plaintiffs’] criticisms is that ARB “made no 
attempt to analyze potential disproportionate public health 
impacts to communities living closest to the facilities eligible to 
participate in the cap and trade system.”  However, Wilmington, 
the community chosen to assess local air quality impacts, the 
plan points out, “includes a diverse range of stationary and 
mobile emission sources, including the ports of Los Angeles and 
Long Beach, railyards, major transportation corridors, refineries, 
power plants, and other industrial and commercial operations.”91 
 
Finally, the Legislature demonstrated its understanding that 
environmental justice is not only a norm, a legal doctrine, and an insight 
addressing environmental hazards to low-income communities and 
communities of color, but also a process mandate.  It explicitly included 
environmental justice groups in the decision-making process.  The Act92 
 
89. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38570 (Deering 2012). 
90. Association of Irritated Residents v. California Air Resources 
Board, 206 Cal. App. 4th 1487, 1505 (2012). 
91. Id. at 39. 
92. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006. 
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creates an Environmental Justice Advisory Committee, and the Committee is 
specifically to be incorporated into the process, which will lead to a scoping 
plan to design the program.93   
IV. California Environmental Justice Requirements’ Role in 
CEQA Review 
As discussed above, longstanding federal statutes and policies require 
incorporation of environmental justice into environmental review at the 
federal level.  Further, federal civil rights laws require all state and local 
agencies that receive federal assistance to incorporate the essential 
elements of environmental justice into their programs.  These requirements, 
together with California’s statutory policies of incorporating environmental 
justice into its environmental programs, lead to the conclusion that it 
should be largely uncontroversial that environmental justice should be an 
essential part of any analysis under CEQA.  Yet, when California Attorney 
General Kamala M. Harris in January 2012 intervened in a CEQA challenge 
explicitly attacking a project’s failure to thoroughly analyze environmental 
justice issues, at least one set of commentators questioned whether this 
“would mark a radical expansion in the role played by CEQA from 
environmental protection to social justice.”94 
CEQA was originally drafted as a state version of NEPA, and California 
courts consider NEPA cases to offer persuasive authority except where 
statutory authority or case law require different conclusions.95  Given that 
California already has parallel but more stringent civil rights laws, and that it 
has taken bolder action by codifying environmental justice protections as 
state policy, it is hard to understand how incorporating environmental 
justice into CEQA analysis can be considered a radical expansion of CEQA, 
especially in light of the federal government’s incorporation of 
environmental justice concerns into NEPA. 
Like NEPA, CEQA provides for an initial study to determine whether 
there are potential significant environmental impacts that require a full 
environmental review, or exceptions or possible mitigation that can 
eliminate the need for a full Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”) and 
instead allow for a negative declaration, or a mitigated negative 
declaration—the equivalent of the federal finding of No Significant Impact.96  
Similar to a federal EIS, if a full EIR is conducted then the alternatives must 
 
93. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38591 (Deering 2012). 
94. Peter Hsiao et al., supra note 2, at 2. 
95. Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, 18 CA. 3d 190, 201 (1976). 
96. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080(c) (Deering 2012); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 
14 (hereinafter “CEQA Guidelines”), §§ 15002(k2), 15063 (2012). 
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be reviewed, significant impacts identified, and proposed mitigation of 
those significant impacts must be discussed.97   
A California EIR, like the federal EIS, is intended to be “an 
informational document which will inform public agency decision makers 
and the public generally of the significant environmental effect of a project, 
identify possible ways to minimize the significant effects, and describe 
reasonable alternatives to the project.”98  As the California Supreme Court 
put it: “Its purpose is to inform the public and its responsible officials of the 
environmental consequences of their decisions before they are made. Thus, 
the EIR ‘protects not only the environment but also informed self-
government.’ “99 
However, in an important departure from NEPA, CEQA is not merely 
information-forcing.  It requires that mitigation measures be deployed to 
reduce impacts to insignificance when feasible.  CEQA specifically prohibits 
a project from being approved if it has significant impacts: 
 
The Legislature finds and declares that it is the policy of the state 
that public agencies should not approve projects as proposed if 
there are feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation measures 
available which would substantially lessen the significant 
environmental effects of such projects . . . .100 
 
“Feasible” is defined in CEQA as “capable of being accomplished in a 
successful manner within a reasonable period of time, taking into account 
economic, environmental, social, and technological factors.”101  
The California Legislature foresaw that there may be circumstances 
under which projects with unavoidable significant impacts (that is, those 
where there is no available feasible means of mitigation) may need to move 
forward: “The Legislature further finds and declares that in the event specific 
economic, social, or other conditions make infeasible such project 
alternatives or such mitigation measures, individual projects may be 
approved in spite of one or more significant effects thereof.”102  However, the 
 
97. CEQA Guidelines § 15121(a). 
98. CEQA Guidelines § 15121(a); compare 40 CFR § 1502.1. 
99. Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, 52 Cal.3d 553, 564 
(1990), quoting Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of 
California, 47 Cal.3d 376, 392 (1988) (emphasis in original). 
100. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002 (Deering 2012); See Mountain Lion 
Foundation v. Fish & Game Comm., 16 Cal.4th 105, 134 (1997). 
101. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21061.1 (Deering 2012) (emphasis added). 
102. Id. at § 21002 (Deering 2012). 
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Legislature required a new set of specific findings that address a broad array 
of factors, including social concerns, in a final cost-benefit analysis: 
 
[N]o public agency shall approve or carry out a project for which 
an environmental impact report has been certified which 
identifies one or more significant effects on the environment that 
would occur if the project is approved or carried out unless both 
of the following occur: 
 
(a) The public agency makes one or more of the following 
findings with respect to each significant effect: 
 
. . . (3) Specific economic, legal, social, technological, or other 
considerations, including considerations for the provision of 
employment opportunities for highly trained workers, make 
infeasible the mitigation measures or alternatives identified in 
the environmental 
impact report. 
 
(b) With respect to significant effects which were subject to a 
finding under paragraph (3) of subdivision (a), the public agency 
finds that specific overriding economic, legal, social, 
technological, or other benefits of the project outweigh the 
significant effects on the environment.103 
 
Only if an agency issues a statement of overriding considerations, with 
supporting findings and substantial evidence, may it approve a project with 
significant impacts, and even then it must reasonably find that the benefits 
of the project outweigh its costs or impacts.104   
Thus, while some have stated correctly that CEQA does not mention 
“environmental justice,”105 social factors play an important, and explicit, part 
of the CEQA review process.  The Legislature stated the intent of CEQA is in 
part to “[c]reate and maintain conditions under which man and nature can 
exist in productive harmony to fulfill the social and economic requirements 
of present and future generations.”106   
It is true that isolated social and economic impacts are not 
“significant” impacts in the context of CEQA, just as they are not 
 
103. Id. at § 21081 (Deering 2012) (emphasis added). 
104. CEQA Guidelines §§ 15021(d), 15093(b). 
105. Peter Hsiao et al., supra note 2, at 2. 
106. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21001(e) (Deering 2012). 
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“significant” under NEPA.107  However, the main thrust of environmental 
justice is to recognize the relationship between social and economic factors, 
on the one hand, and environmental impacts on the other hand.  This 
relationship, consistent with CEQA’s intent, is clearly covered under CEQA.   
The statute and its implementing regulations, the CEQA Guidelines,108 
make this coverage explicit.  CEQA states: “Substantial evidence is not . . . 
evidence of social or economic impacts that do not contribute to, or are not 
caused by, physical impacts on the environment.109  This provision only 
excludes social and economic factors unrelated to physical impacts on the 
environment. 
The CEQA Guidelines go on to say that economic or social impacts 
that are related to physical impacts must be addressed: 
 
Economic or social changes may be used, however, to determine 
that a physical change shall be regarded as a significant effect on 
the environment. Where a physical change is caused by 
economic or social effects of a project, the physical change may 
be regarded as a significant effect in the same manner as any 
other physical change resulting from the project. Alternatively, 
economic and social effects of a physical change may be used to 
determine that the physical change is a significant effect on the 
environment. If the physical change causes adverse economic or 
social effects on people, those adverse effects may be used as a 
factor in determining whether the physical change is 
significant.110 
 
The CEQA Guidelines further affirm the importance of social and 
economic factors in determining significance, either as part of a causal chain 
or as an exacerbating factor that makes a physical impact significant: 
 
(a) Economic or social effects of a project shall not be treated as 
significant effects on the environment. An EIR may trace a chain 
of cause and effect from a proposed decision on a project 
through anticipated economic or social changes resulting from 
the project to physical changes caused in turn by the economic 
or social changes. The intermediate economic or social changes 
 
107. CEQA Guidelines § 15064(e). 
108. The guidelines are proposed by the California Office of Planning 
and Research and adopted by the California Resources Agency and codified 
in the California Code of Regulations under Title 14 pursuant to CAL. PUB. 
RES. CODE § 21083 (Deering 2012). 
109. Id. at § 2180(e) (Deering 2012); see Id. at § 2108.2 (Deering 2012). 
110. CEQA Guidelines § 15064(e). 
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need not be analyzed in any detail greater than necessary to trace 
the chain of cause and effect. The focus of the analysis shall be 
on the physical changes. 
 
(b) Economic or social effects of a project may be used to 
determine the significance of physical changes caused by the 
project. For example, if the construction of a new freeway or rail 
line divides an existing community, the construction would be 
the physical change, but the social effect on the community 
would be the basis for determining that the effect would be 
significant.  As an additional example, if the construction of a 
road and the resulting increase in noise in an area disturbed 
existing religious practices in the area, the disturbance of the 
religious practices could be used to determine that the 
construction and use of the road and the resulting noise would 
be significant effects on the environment. The religious practices 
would need to be analyzed only to the extent to show that the 
increase in traffic and noise would conflict with the religious 
practices. Where an EIR uses economic or social effects to 
determine that a physical change is significant, the EIR shall 
explain the reason for determining that the effect is significant.111 
 
Thus, one California appellate court looking at a project that would 
cause overcrowding in schools – and in turn the construction of a new 
school – held that the physical impact due to social overcrowding was 
significant.112  By contrast, another appellate court held that a project that 
would cause some overcrowding in a school but would not lead to the 
construction of a new school did not cause a significant impact.113  Thus, 
when social impacts relate to physical impacts, they are well within CEQA’s 
purview. 
In spite of these explicit requirements to analyze the relationship 
between socioeconomic factors and physical impacts, there is a developing 
line of California cases that mark an important exception.  These cases 
essentially stand for the proposition that it is CEQA’s role to determine a 
project’s impacts on the environment, not the environment’s impact upon a 
project.  Thus, a new school to be placed near freeways with a large amount 
 
111. Id. at § 15131. 
112. El Dorado Union High Sch. Dist. v. City of Placerville, 144 Cal. 
App. 3d 123 (1983). 
113. Goleta Union School Dist. v. Regents of University of California, 
37 Cal. App. 4th 1025 (1995). 
West  Northwest, Vol. 19, No. 1, Winter 2013 
 
66 
 
of air emissions,114 or a zoning change allowing for residential development 
near a source of odors,115 or placement of a residential facility for young 
male drug and alcohol users near a contaminated site116 do not cause a 
significant impact, even though they may attract people to these potentially 
dangerous sites.  However, this exception should not be exaggerated to 
swallow up the fundamental rule.   
In the most recent case along these lines, Ballona Wetlands Land Trust v. 
City of Los Angeles,117 the Ballona Wetlands Land Trust and Ballona Ecosystem 
Education Project challenged an environmental review of the second phase 
of a new coastal master plan of a mixed retail/residential community.  The 
new community was not an environmental justice minority community nor 
one associated with a concentration of toxic air emissions.  The principle 
objection was that the project, located about two miles from the coast, 
might be inundated as a result of climate change that is anticipated to cause 
sea levels to rise.118 
The court understood this argument as another example of a project 
allegedly putting people in harm’s way.  It found this was not a 
consideration under CEQA, holding that “[t]he purpose of an EIR is to 
identify the significant effects of a project on the environment, not the 
significant effects of the environment on the project.”119  The court 
specifically limited CEQA Guideline section 15126.2, which states that an 
“EIR should evaluate any potentially significant impacts of locating 
development in other areas susceptible to hazardous conditions . . . .”120  The 
court made the extent of its disapproval clear, however, in a footnote: 
“Guidelines section 15126.2, subdivision (a) is consistent with CEQA only to 
the extent that such impacts constitute impacts on the environment caused 
by the development rather than impacts on the project caused by the 
environment.”121 
 
114. City of Long Beach v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 176 Cal. 
App. 4th 889, 905 (2009). 
115. South Orange County Wastewater Authority v. City of Dana Point, 
196 Cal. App. 4th 1604, 1614-18 (2011). 
116. Baird v. County of Contra Costa, 32 Cal. App. 4th 1464, 1468 
(1995).  
117. Ballona Wetlands Land Trust v. City of Los Angeles, 201 Cal. App. 
4th 455 (2011). 
118. Id. at 472. 
119. Id. at 473. 
120. Id. at 474. 
121. Id. at 474, n. 9.  Ballona is a significant impact case and should not 
be read as dismissing the need for an EIR to describe the setting of a 
project.  Indeed the Ballona court noted that the respondent City had after 
 West  Northwest, Vol. 19, No. 1, Winter 2013 
 
67 
 
These cases involve problems that are very different from the problems 
of clustering projects that contribute to toxic hot spots and perpetuate the 
problem of disproportionate impacts for low-income communities or 
communities of color, or the complete failure to analyze the impacts of a 
new project on a vulnerable subpopulation that is already present near a 
site.  The heart of the environmental justice movement has not been an 
attempt to keep housing or people out of low-income communities or 
communities of color, which may be beset by disproportionate high risks 
from toxics and other environmental threats, but rather to restore existing 
communities to a healthy environment.  As stated in the “Principles of 
Environmental Justice,” one of the founding documents of the 
environmental justice movement, “[e]nvironmental justice affirms the need 
for urban and rural ecological policies to clean up and rebuild our cities and 
rural areas in balance with nature, honoring the cultural integrity of all our 
communities, and providing fair access for all to the full range of 
resources.”122 
In theory, Ballona and its line of cases can be seen as limiting certain 
environmental justice considerations under CEQA, to the extent that 
challenges are made to zoning, programs, or projects that seek to channel 
minorities into minority communities that are exposed to disproportionate 
risks, thus perpetuating or exacerbating segregation and environmental 
racism.  Yet, to the extent that those decisions would be discriminating or 
denying protected subpopulations the benefits of governmental programs, 
they would be more appropriately addressed by state and federal civil rights 
claims in any event.123  Meanwhile, these cases in no way affect the 
 
criticism of the draft EIR provided a description of potential inundation from 
rising seas due to climate change.  201 Cal. App. 4th at 476.  An EIR may still 
have to incorporate changes to a site resulting from climate change to set an 
adequate baseline for evaluating impacts.  See Neighbors for Smart Rail v. 
Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority, 204 Cal. App. 4th 1480, 1491 
(2012); Communities for a Better Environment v. City of Richmond, 184 Cal. 
App. 4th 70, 82 (2010) (stating “a complete description of a project has to 
address not only the immediate environmental consequences of going 
forward with the project, but also all ‘reasonably foreseeable consequence[s] 
of the initial project.’ “). 
122. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RESOURCE CENTER, Principles of Environmental 
Justice, available at http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/princej.html (adopted on Oct. 27, 
1991, in Washington D.C. at the People of Color Environmental Leadership 
Summit). 
123. E.g., Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 
(outlawing discrimination in sale or rental of housing and other related 
practices). 
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predominant problem of environmental injustice which channels or sites 
noxious projects into minority communities. 
There are numerous cases affirming CEQA’s role in analyzing 
cumulative impacts as described below which may be applied to projects 
that create and expand toxic hot spots.  A lead agency is required under 
CEQA to assess whether a proposed project’s cumulative effect requires an 
EIR.124  A project is deemed to have a significant effect on the environment if 
the “possible effects of a project are individually limited but cumulatively 
considerable.125  As one court put it: 
 
Cumulative impact analysis is necessary because the full 
environmental impact of a proposed project cannot be gauged in 
a vacuum.  One of the most important environmental lessons 
that has been learned is that environmental damage often occurs 
incrementally from a variety of small sources. These sources 
appear insignificant when considered individually, but assume 
threatening dimensions when considered collectively with other 
sources with which they interact.126 
 
This court’s description of cumulative impact analysis describes the 
essence of what has been a chief concern of environmental justice activists 
about toxic hot spots.  In an urban area, individual sources may comply with 
federal and state clean air laws, but their cumulative impact may cause 
significant impacts.  Evaluating that possibility fits exactly within CEQA’s 
concept of cumulative impacts, and has for many years. 
Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford127 is a foundational case 
addressing the problem of air pollutant hot spots.  The court quotes a law 
review article by Dan Selmi that aptly describes this potential environmental 
justice issue: 
 
One of the most important environmental lessons evident from 
past experience is that environmental damage often occurs 
incrementally from a variety of small sources. These sources 
appear insignificant, assuming threatening dimensions only 
when considered in light of the other sources with which they 
interact. Perhaps the best example is air pollution, where 
 
124. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21083(b) (Deering 2012); CEQA Guidelines § 
15064(i)(1). 
125. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21083(b) (Deering 2012). 
126. Communities for a Better Environment v. California Resources 
Agency, 103 Cal. App. 4th 98, 114 (2002). 
127. 221 Cal. App. 3d 692 (1990). 
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thousands of relatively small sources of pollution cause a serious 
environmental health problem. 
 
CEQA has responded to this problem of incremental 
environmental degradation by requiring analysis of cumulative 
impacts. Because of the critical nature of this concern, courts 
have been receptive to claims that environmental documents 
paid insufficient attention to cumulative impacts. For example, in 
San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth, [San Franciscans for Reasonable 
Growth v. City and County of San Francisco (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 61] 
the court stated that absent meaningful cumulative analysis, 
there would never be any awareness or control over the speed 
and manner of downtown development. Without that control, 
‘piecemeal development would inevitably cause havoc in virtually 
every aspect of the urban environment.’ 
 
This judicial concern often is reinforced by the results of 
cumulative environmental analysis; the outcome may appear 
startling once the nature of the cumulative impact problem has 
been grasped.128  
 
On the basis of these principles, the Kings County Farm Bureau court 
struck down an EIR for a power plant project that dismissed the significance 
of its ozone emissions because it was a small part of a much worse problem.   
The decision in Kings County Farm Bureau has been followed in other 
cases.  In Los Angeles Unified School District v. City of Los Angeles,129 the court 
found that traffic noise from a project, while individually and incrementally 
insignificant, would be cumulatively significant when combined with 
existing sources of noise.130  The court specifically found that the setting, a 
school, was an important consideration, providing another example of how 
social factors can affect a determination of significance.131 
In Bakersfield Citizens for Local Control v. City of Bakersfield,132 the court 
disapproved of an EIR’s failure to discuss the development of two 
 
128. Selmi, The Judicial  Development of the California Environmental Quality 
Act 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 197, 244, fn. omitted., (1984) (quoted in Kings County 
Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford, supra note 127, at 720-21). 
129. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. City of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. 
App. 4th 1019 (1997). 
130. Id. at 1025-26. 
131. Id. at 1026; see CEQA Guidelines § 15064(b). 
132. Bakersfield Citizens for Local Control v. City of Bakersfield, 124 
Cal. App. 4th 1184 (2004). 
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competing shopping centers together with all past, present and reasonably 
anticipated future projects.133   
A commonplace dismissal of environmental justice claims is that, 
given the deteriorated conditions in which minority and low-income 
communities often find themselves, these groups will not notice a project 
that simply adds to the undesirability of the community’s environment.  The 
Bakersfield court was presented with a similar argument about the poor air 
quality in the San Joaquin Valley, and stated: “The magnitude of the current 
air quality problems in the San Joaquin Valley cannot be used to trivialize 
the cumulative contributions of the shopping centers and the scope of the 
analysis cannot be artificially limited to a restricted portion of the air 
basin.”134  The court gave an example of a question the EIR should answer, 
which has particular force in environmental justice cases: “Will combined 
traffic cause an increase in mobile emissions that adversely affects sensitive 
receptors?” 
The Bakersfield court also affirmed the line of California cases that 
approved CEQA Guidelines section 15064’s recognition that an indirect 
effect that includes social and economic causes but culminates in physical 
impacts may be a significant impact that requires environmental analysis.135  
In reviewing a proposed Wal-Mart anchored shopping center, the court held: 
“[W]hen there is evidence suggesting that the economic and social effects 
caused by the proposed shopping center ultimately could result in urban 
decay or deterioration, then the lead agency is obligated to assess this 
indirect impact.”136 
The application of this urban decay case to environmental justice 
cases is clear.  Where a project exacerbates the disparities between people 
of different race, income or other social factors contributing to physical 
impacts in the community, that is the kind of impact that must be analyzed 
under CEQA.  This applies whether direct pollution impacts affect a 
vulnerable community exposed to other sources of pollution, or whether it 
causes an overall deterioration and decay in the physical attributes of a 
community.  
CEQA, as an information-forcing environmental review statute, also 
provides process protections that are critical to environmental justice.  
According to the CEQA Guidelines: 
 
EIRs and negative declarations should be prepared as early as 
feasible in the planning process to enable environmental 
considerations to influence project program and design and yet 
 
133. Id. at 1218-19. 
134. Id. at 1219. 
135. Id. at 1205-1206. 
136. Id. at 1207. 
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late enough to provide meaningful information for environmental 
assessment.137 
 
The Guidelines specifically recommend an early scoping process, and 
provides that “the Lead Agency may also consult directly with any person or 
organization it believes will be concerned with the environmental effects of 
the project.”138  
The CEQA statute provides that documents should be user-friendly for 
the public, and environmental justice advocates have successfully argued 
that the documents should be printed in the primary language of the 
population affected.139  The statute requires: “Documents prepared pursuant 
to this division be organized and written in a manner that will be meaningful 
and useful to decision makers and to the public.”140  The CEQA Guidelines 
require that “EIRs shall be written in plain language and may use 
appropriate graphics so that decision makers and the public can rapidly 
understand the documents.”141  And the documents should be timely: 
 
Information relevant to the significant effects of a project, 
alternatives, and mitigation measures which substantially reduce 
the effects shall be made available as soon as possible by lead 
agencies, other public agencies, and interested persons and 
organizations.142 
 
CEQA’s process requirements represent a powerful tool for 
environmental justice advocates: 
 
[N]oncompliance with the information disclosure provisions of 
this division which precludes relevant information from being 
presented to the public agency . . .  may constitute a prejudicial 
abuse of discretion . . . regardless of whether a different outcome 
would have resulted if the public agency had complied with 
those provisions.143 
 
137. CEQA Guidelines § 15004. 
138. Id. at § 15083. 
139. El Pueblo Para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, No. 
366045, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 20357 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento County, Dec. 30, 
1991).  
140. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21003(b) (Deering 2012). 
141. CEQA Guidelines § 15140. 
142. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21003.1(b) (Deering 2012). 
143. Id. at § 21005(a) (Deering 2012). 
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For example, the failure to abide by these process requirements 
temporarily halted California’s global warming trading regime.  In Association 
of Irritated Residents v. California Air Resources Board,144 the plaintiffs successfully 
argued that CARB, the lead agency for California’s climate change program, 
failed to adequately analyze alternatives to its Cap-And-Trade strategy, and 
it jumped the gun by approving the plan before the staff completed their 
responses to comments on their CEQA environmental analysis.  The 
California Superior Court in San Francisco issued a writ requiring CARB to 
reconsider the plan, and to respond to comments.  The court quoted the 
California Supreme Court’s affirmation of the public process: 
 
The written response requirement ensures that members of the 
Commission will fully consider the information necessary to 
render decisions that intelligently take into account the 
environmental consequences . . . .  It also promotes the policy of 
citizen input underlying CEQA . . . .  When the written responses 
are prepared and issued after a decision has been made, 
however, the purpose served by such a requirement cannot be 
achieved.”145  
 
CARB eventually redid its alternatives analysis, considered responses to old 
and new comments before making its decision, and has now begun the 
implementation of its plan, albeit delayed a year.146   
 
It is therefore incorrect to say that “social justice” is separate from 
CEQA, that CEQA does not consider social factors, or that environmental 
justice has no place in the CEQA context.  Environmental justice represents 
an insight into the relationship between social and economic factors on the 
one hand, and actual environmental impacts on people and their 
communities on the other.  Environmental justice encapsulates this link 
between people and the way they treat each other and their environment.  
Thus, consideration of race and broader demographics of a potentially 
 
144. Associated of Irritated Residents et al. v. California Air Resources 
Board et al., No. CPF-09-509562, (Cal. Super. Ct. San Francisco County, 
March 18, 2011), available at http://ggucuel.org/update-sf-court-affirms-tenta 
tive-ceqa-ruling-on-ab-32. 
145. Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Comm., 16 Cal. 4th 
105, 133 (1997). 
146. See Alan Ramo, Update: SF Court Affirms Tentative CEQA Ruling on AB 
32, GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW CENTER ON URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW BLOG (MAR. 23, 2011), http://ggucuel.org/update-sf-court-affirms-tenta 
tive-ceqa-ruling-on-ab-32 (blog for discussion of the progress of the case 
and the judge’s decision). 
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impacted community is crucial to a proper, thorough, and sensitive 
environmental review. 
V. The California Attorney General’s Intervention in 
Environmental Justice Cases 
It is this regulatory backdrop, that CEQA is directly related to 
environmental justice, which allows for a proper analysis of the California 
Attorney General’s assertion regarding the State’s environmental justice 
concerns.  State law provides that the “Attorney General shall be permitted 
to intervene in any judicial or administrative proceeding in which facts are 
alleged concerning pollution or adverse environmental effects which could 
affect the public generally.”147  The Attorney General is required to be 
informed of any case being brought under CEQA.148   
Given this authority, in September 2011, the California Attorney 
General first intervened through a challenge by the Center for Community 
Action and Environmental Justice to an industrial development next to a 
primarily Hispanic and low-income residential community in Riverside 
County, California.  The Attorney General alleged that the project’s addition 
of 1,500 diesel truck trips per day would exacerbate “disproportionate 
impacts on the people living . . . near the Project area, who already suffer 
from substantial exposure to toxic air contaminants.”149   
In an even more intriguing case, in January 2012, the Attorney General 
petitioned to intervene in the case of Cleveland National Forest Foundation and 
Center for Biologic Diversity v. San Diego Association of Governments, et al.150  The case 
is a challenge to San Diego County’s most recent Regional Transportation 
Plan (“RTP”) adopted pursuant to the federal Clean Air Act and state law 
 
147. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12606 (Deering 2012). 
148. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 388 (Deering 2012); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 
21167.7 (Deering 2012). 
149. People’s Compl. in Intervention and Pet. for Writ of Mandate at 4, 
para. 12, Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice v. County 
of Riverside et al., Cal. Superior Court of Riverside County, No. RIC 1112063 
(Sept. 6, 2011), available at oag.ca.gov/environment/ceqa/litigation-settl 
ements/. 
150. People of the State of California’s Pet. for Writ of Mandate in 
Intervention (hereinafter “People’s Pet.”), Cleveland National Forest 
Foundation and Center for Biologic Diversity v. San Diego Association of 
Governments, et al. Cal. Superior Court of San Diego County, No. 37-2011-
00101593-CU-TT-CTL (Jan. 20, 2012), available at oag.ca.gov/environment/ 
ceqa/litigation-settlements. 
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provisions for funding transportation related projects.151  Interestingly, this 
plan was the first in California to include a section addressing California’s 
SB 375, the Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act of 2008.152  
As its name implies, the Act requires metropolitan planning organizations to 
develop regional greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for passenger 
vehicles and to develop a Sustainable Community Strategy (“SCS”) for 
attaining these targets through integrated land use, housing and 
transportation planning.  The Act further requires the strategy is to be 
incorporated into the federally enforceable Regional Transportation Plan 
(“RTP”) and subsequently forming the Regional Transportation 
Plan/Sustainable Communities Strategy (“RTP/SCS”).   
In a nutshell, the Attorney General and the plaintiffs argued that the 
Plan emphasizes traditional freeway projects more than it should, and fails 
to direct sufficient funding to projects such as mass transit that would 
reduce air pollution.153  This, in turn, impacts air quality in several 
communities already bearing disproportionate air pollution impacts and 
interfering with California’s goal of reducing greenhouse gases: 
 
[T]he People challenge the EIR’s adequacy as to the 
environmental harm that may result from the project’s emphasis 
on freeway and highway expansion and extension, to the 
detriment of public transportation and air quality, its adequacy 
and accuracy in analyzing and disclosing the air quality impacts 
of the RTP/SCS, especially the impacts on communities that are 
already overburdened by pollution, and the project’s failure to 
achieve long-term and sustainable reductions/in greenhouse gas 
emissions.154 
 
Peter Hsaio and his co-authors argue, “the attorney general has taken 
an aggressive position that EJ impacts must be addressed under CEQA.”155  
They point out that CEQA does not use the words “environmental justice,” 
that no court has required a disparate impacts analysis under CEQA, and 
that environmental documents generally do not provide that analysis.156   
As discussed above, however, the elements underlying environmental 
justice analysis have long been included under CEQA case law, statute, and 
 
151. 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 66508-66518 (Deering 
2012). 
152. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 14522.1 et seq., § 65080(b)(2) (Deering 2012). 
153. People’s Pet., supra note 150, at p. 7, para. 18. 
154. Id. 
155. Hsaio et al, supra note 2, at 3. 
156. Id. 
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guidelines, as well as NEPA (CEQA’s regulatory model).  Further, there is 
nothing shocking about allegations challenging freeway oriented 
transportation programs that disfavor mass transit, as similar cases have 
been brought before.157  Indeed, previous federal cases have alleged that 
transportation agencies’ funding had violated civil rights laws by 
discriminating against urban core bus transit.158   
Hsiao and his co-authors also fail to note that the issue in the San 
Diego case159 is not whether there should be a Title VI environmental justice 
or disparate impact analysis.  San Diego did such analysis, but allegedly 
stopped at the point where it would connect that analysis with air pollution 
from mobile sources using expanded freeways. 
All that seems to be new is the California Attorney General’s explicit 
argument that the failure to analyze such potential disparate impacts on 
vulnerable subpopulations raises CEQA concerns:  
 
[The FEIR] [d]oes not perform an adequate analysis to determine 
whether the health impacts of exposure to increased particulate 
matter emissions will be more severe for low-income or minority 
communities that already suffer from disproportionate health 
burdens from existing levels of localized air pollution.160 
 
The complaint refers to “the adverse effect of the project on the 
environment experienced by communities that already are overburdened by 
pollution . . . .”161  It notes that San Diego has the seventh worst ozone 
problem in the nation.162  It specifies that particulate air pollution creates a 
risk of 480 excess cases of cancer per million (San Diego’s population is 3.2 
million), and that much of the particulates are from car and truck traffic on 
the region’s freeways and highways.163  And, not surprisingly, it alleges that 
the Final EIR (“FEIR”) failed to focus upon how “the most vulnerable people 
 
157. E.g., Citizens for a Better Environment v. Deukmejian, 1990 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 17976; 34 ERC (BNA) 1592 (N.D. Cal. 1990)  (“Plaintiffs assert 
that ‘freeway happy’ MTC continues to ignore the mandate of the Clean Air 
Act in its relentless pursuit of highway expansion as the primary solution to 
problems of congestion and pollution.”). 
158. Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 
2011); Labor/Community Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. County Metro. Transp. Auth., 
263 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2001). 
159. People’s Pet., supra note 150. 
160. Id. at para. 22(d).    
161. Id. at para. 1. 
162. Id.  
163. Id. at para. 2. 
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in the region will be affected (e.g., those living directly adjacent to freeways 
and highways), or how residents’ risk of developing cancer will increase 
based on emissions from the RTP/SCS’s freeway and highway projects.”164 
The complaint refers to and incorporates the Attorney General’s 
comments submitted during the review process as described below.  These 
comments are more explicit with regard to San Diego’s alleged failure to 
address the problem of disproportionate impacts to vulnerable 
subpopulations: 
 
The harm from these pollutants is not necessarily distributed 
equally throughout the region, but may be more concentrated in 
communities immediately adjacent to large-scale industrial and 
commercial development and major transportation corridors, 
and may more particularly affect certain segments of the 
population.  As discussed below, our review of the DEIR 
indicates that SANDAG has set too low a bar for determining 
whether the air quality impacts of its RTP/SCS are significant, and 
further, has failed to analyze the impacts of projected increases 
in pollution on communities are sensitive or already 
overburdened with pollution, in violation of CEQA.165 
 
The Attorney General’s comments are consistent with the classic 
definition of a community vulnerable to environmental justice.  The Attorney 
General’s comments cite to the Kings County Farm Bureau case, quoting that 
“[t]he significance of an activity depends upon the setting.”166 
Ironically, as noted in the Attorney General’s comments, San Diego 
included a chapter in its Draft EIR (“DEIR”), and eventually its FEIR, entitled 
“Social Equity: Title VI and Environmental Justice.”167  The chapter appears to 
document a very thorough environmental justice process.  However, as the 
Attorney General spotted when commenting upon the DEIR, it has a “lack of 
any discussion of the impacts of the increased air pollution that will result 
from carrying out the RTP/SCS on communities already severely impacted by 
air pollution.”168  Instead, it focuses strictly upon providing “an equitable 
level of transportation services for all populations.”169   
 
164. Id. at para. 4. 
165. Id. at Exhibit I, p. 2. 
166. Id., quoting Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford, supra at 
note 127, at 718. 
167. SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTS, 2050 REGIONAL 
TRANSPORTATION PLAN, Ch. 4 (Oct. 28, 2011). 
168. People’s Pet., supra note 150, Exhibit I, p. 4 
169. 2050 REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLAN, supra note 167, at  4-4. 
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Providing equal access to transportation is indeed a worthwhile 
environmental justice goal.  The chapter appears to document a thorough 
demographic analysis of what it calls a majority minority county, and the 
relationship of subpopulations to access for housing, jobs, services and 
recreation.  Yet the entire section on public health is focused upon 
encouraging access to transportation to address mobility issues for the 
disabled and elderly, and obesity.  There is no discussion of air pollution in 
relation to overburdened communities in the public health section.170   
The Attorney General’s comments correctly spell out what a CEQA 
analysis requires to properly address environmental justice: 
 
CEQA requires that the significance of environmental impacts be 
considered in context.  (Kings County Farm Bureau, supra, 221 
Cal.App.3d at 718)  Such context may appropriately include (1) 
whether the region includes communities or subpopulations that 
may be particularly sensitive to increases in pollution; and (2) 
whether such communities or groups are already at or near their 
capacity to bear any additional pollution burden.171  
 
The Attorney General’s complaint is silent as to what may make 
communities overburdened, and how social factors may be involved.  But 
the incorporated comments clearly demonstrate how the essence of 
environmental justice’s concerns with demographic factors relate to physical 
significant impacts upon people: 
 
“[A] number of studies have reported increased sensitivity to 
pollution, for communities with low income levels, low education 
levels, and other biological and social factors.  This combination 
of multiple pollutants and increased sensitivity in these 
communities can result in a higher cumulative pollution impact.”  
(Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment, Cumulative 
Impacts: Building a Scientific Foundation (Dec. 2010), Exec. Summary 
at p. ix.).  [Available at http://oehha.ca.gov/ej/cipa123110.html]  
Research in other parts of California has shown that 
disadvantaged and minority communities are often exposed to 
unhealthful air more frequently and at higher levels than other 
 
170. Id. at 4-63.  The author is not intending to comment upon the 
entire document or its legal sufficiency but it is striking that the 
Environmental Justice section failed to explicitly address freeway auto and 
truck pollution issues. 
171. People’s Pet., supra note 150, Exhibit I, p. 4. 
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groups. [footnote omitted] Identifying these communities is an 
essential part of describing the relevant CEQA setting.172 
 
Why does race matter?  Is this merely an appeal to social justice?  The 
Attorney General correctly points out that race, income, and other social 
factors may show that lurking in communities demarcated by these social 
factors are multiple and hidden sources of pollution or other factors that 
make additional pollution more significant with regard to public health.  
Presumably, this can be attributed to historical or current social and 
economic dynamics in our society.  This concern is well supported by 
available data, as previously described, and it is now formally recognized in 
state government and academia.  Recently, California’s Office of Health 
Hazard Assessment released guidelines for addressing cumulative impacts 
in the context of related social conditions: 
 
Cal/EPA’s screening methodology . . . starts with an understand-
ing of which individuals, or groups of people, may be more 
sensitive to additional exposures.  By considering social factors 
such as educational level, economic factors such as income level, 
and other factors, Cal/EPA can develop a more complete picture 
of the cumulative impacts on communities.173 
 
The University of California at Davis recently used this approach to analyze a 
low-income community in Fresno, California.174 
 
This approach to CEQA is nothing more than what CEQA already 
addresses in requiring an adequate analysis of the environmental setting, an 
essential topic of all EIRs.175  As the Third District Court of Appeal has 
explained, “[b]efore the impacts of a project can be assessed and mitigation 
 
172. People’s Pet., supra note 150, Exhibit I at 4.  For a summary of the 
attorney general’s position on CEQA and environmental justice, see 
CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ENVIRONMENAL JUSTICE AT THE LOCAL AND 
REGIONAL LEVEL, LEGAL BACKGROUND (JULY 10, 2012), available at http://oag.ca. 
gov/sites/all/files/pdfs/environment/ej_fact_sheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 
2012). 
173. OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, CUMULATIVE IMPACTS: 
BUILDING A SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATION (Dec. 2010), available at http://oehha.ca. 
gov/ej/pdf/CIReport123110.pdf. 
174. UC DAVIS, CTR. FOR REG’L CHANGE, LAND OF RISK, LAND OF 
OPPORTUNITY, CUMULATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL VULNERABILITIES IN CALIFORNIA’S SAN 
JOAQUIN VALLEY (Nov. 2011), available at http://regionalchange.ucdavis.edu/ 
publications/Report_Land_of_Risk_Land_of_Opportunity.pdf. 
175. CEQA Guidelines § 15125(a). 
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measures considered, an EIR must describe the existing environment.  It is 
only against this baseline that any significant environmental effects can be 
determined.”176  Thus, a failure to identify all present pollutants and other 
stresses impacting a community would prevent an adequate measurement 
of the significance of additional sources of pollution. 
The Attorney General’s comments extend this analysis to the 
greenhouse gases that are released by automobiles and trucks.  The 
comments do not merely argue in favor of social justice, they point out the 
relationship between social factors and the implications of the physical 
effects of the proposed project: 
 
The burdens of climate change will not be shared equally.  Future 
climate scenarios are expected to disproportionately affect, for 
example, the urban poor, the elderly and children, traditional 
societies, agricultural workers and rural populations.177 
 
This argument is consistent with other studies establishing that the 
effects of climate change could potentially cause disparate impacts to low-
income communities in the United States.178   
Whether the Attorney General is right about the specific facts of this 
case depends upon what the record will show, and is subsequently beyond 
the reach of this article.179  The point to emphasize is that the Attorney 
General’s arguments, on their face, are well within CEQA authority and are 
consistent with the federal approach to environmental justice and 
environmental project review.  The issue is not whether social injustice is a 
 
176. County of Amador v. El Dorado County Water Agency, 76 Cal. 
App. 4th 931, 952 (1999). 
177. People’s Pet., supra note 150, at Ex. I, p. 7 (citing CALIFORNIA’S 
OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, INDICATORS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE IN CALIFORNIA:  ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IMPACTS (Dec. 2010) at p. 2., 
available at http://oehha.ca.gov/multimedia/epic/epic123110.html).  
178. E.g. MANUEL PASTOR, RACHEL MORELLO FROSCH, JAMES SADD & JUSTIN 
SCOGGINS, MINDING THE CLIMATE GAP, USC Program for Environmental and 
Regional Equity (2010), available at http://dornsife.usc.edu/pere/documents/ 
mindingthegap.pdf; RACHEL MORELLO FROSCH, MANUEL PASTOR, JIM SADD, AND 
SETH SHONKOFF, THE CLIMATE GAP:  INEQUALITIES IN HOW CLIMATE CHANGE HURTS 
AMERICANS AND HOW TO CLOSE THE GAP, USC PROGRAM FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
REGIONAL EQUITY (2009), available at http://dornsife.usc.edu/pere/publications/ 
ClimateGapReport_full_report_web.pdf. 
179. The California Attorney General was allowed to intervene and, as 
of Oct. 8, 2012 the case is still pending.  STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, http://oag.ca.gov/environment/ceqa/ 
litigation-settlements (last visited Oct. 8, 2012). 
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matter for CEQA review.  The Attorney General correctly points out that if 
this project increases air pollutants, including particulates and greenhouse 
gases, then the significance of those impacts on human beings are best 
understood by understanding the demographics of the population and the 
constellation of other sources or stresses that may make those populations 
particularly vulnerable.180  The failure to do this analysis, if true, would 
according to the analysis of this article violate CEQA requirements for 
properly analyzing the impacts from the project. 
VI. Conclusion 
Environmental justice is now an established doctrine of federal 
administrative law that has survived multiple presidential administrations.  
It is rooted in federal constitutional and statutory civil rights protections.  It 
allows for a more in-depth and sensitive application of NEPA to more fully 
capture the potential adverse significant impacts, alternatives, and 
mitigation methods that would protect communities of color, low-income 
communities, and other communities whose social demographics lead to 
increased exposure to pollutants and serious disparate impacts. 
California has been a leader among the states in applying this doctrine 
to state law as a matter of policy and administrative practice.  Not 
surprisingly, the California Attorney General is seeking to apply this law in 
the State’s environmental review processes.  Even though critics may 
consider this application to be a radical social justice experiment, the 
Attorney General is acting well within state law and the federal approach in 
articulating the importance of environmental justice concerns when 
implementing CEQA. 
 
 
180. See, supra note 176, 177. 
